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CASE NOTES
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Refusal to Bargain—
Use of Authorization Cards to Establish Majority Status Within One
Year of Election Defeat.—Conren, Inc. v. NLRB. 1—In December 1962,
Conren, Inc., operator of the Great Scot Supermarket, learned of organiza-
tional activity by Retail Clerks Local 550, and filed azrepresentation petition.
Soon thereafter, Conren withdrew the petition and, without any election,
signed a collective-bargaining contract with Teamsters Local 144. Retail
Clerks promptly filed a section 8(a) (2) 2 charge against Conren, which was
countered with a section 8 (b) (7) (A) 3 charge against Retail Clerks. Conren,
however, withdrew this charge and joined with the Teamsters in signing a
settlement agreement, approved by a Regional Director of the National Labor
Relations Board, which provided in part that Conren would not recognize the
Teamsters unless and until they were certified. Conren then filed another
representation petition. Shortly thereafter, a Board-conducted election was
held to determine whether Local 550 of the Retail Clerks Union (hereinafter
called the union), the Teamsters, or no union was to represent Conren's em-
ployees at its Great Scot store. Both the Retail Clerks and the Teamsters lost
the election, and the Board certified this result. The validity of this election
has not been attacked.
Nine months and sixteen days after the valid election, Conren received a
demand from the union for recognition as the collective-bargaining represen-
tative for a unit consisting of fifty-three employees, thirty-two of whom had
designated the union as their representative by signing authorization cards.
Conren ignored this demand, whereupon the union filed section 8(a) (5) 4
charges. Conren's defense rested on Section 9(c) (3) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, which states that "no election shall be directed in any
bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-
month period, a valid election shall have been held." 5 Conren contended that
there was no duty to bargain with the union, since it had lost a valid election
within the past year. Although section 9(c) (3) of the act expressly embraces
only an "election" within its limitation, Conren reasoned that the national
368 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.), enforcing 156 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 61 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1966).
2 Section 8(a) (2) of the LMRA provides that "it shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer . . . (2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it ......61 Stat.
1'40 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1964).
3 Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the LMRA provides that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
. . . (7) to picket . . . any employer where an object thereof is forcing or
requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees , . . (A) where the employer has lawfully
recognized in accordance with this subchapter any other labor organization ....
73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.0 § 158(b)(7)(A) (1964).
4 Section 8(a)(5) provides that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section [9(a)1 . . . ." 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
5 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1964).
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labor policy of furthering industrial stability equally afforded a basis for
precluding a union which had lost a representation election from acquiring
within the prescribed twelve-month period a representational status by other
means, such as the signing of authorization cards by a majority of the
employees involved .°
The Board upheld the Trial Examiner's findings that Conren had vio-
lated sections 8(a) (1), (2), (3), and (5) of the act, and ordered Conren to
cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found. 7 Affirmatively, the
Board required, inter alia, that Conren, upon request, bargain collectively
with the union.° The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the
Board order. HELD: An employer violates section 8(a) (5) of the LMRA
by refusing to bargain with a union which demands recognition on the basis
of authorization cards, even though the union has lost a representation elec-
tion within the preceding twelve months, unless a good-faith doubt as to
majority status can be shown.
In a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Kiley took the position that Conren
had not violated section 8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain, and that the
authorization cards were insufficient to put Conren under a duty to bargain,
because the union had lost a valid election within the preceding year. The
dissent reasoned that the prohibition in section 9(c) (3) is not limited
merely to elections, but to all forms of recognitional demands, and that this
section indicates a congressional policy of industrial peace which would be
disrupted as much by the solicitation of authorization cards as by a second
election. Judge Kiley argued, moreover, that although Congress had placed a
time limit on only one means of selecting representatives, the court was not
precluded from imposing this limit on other means of securing representatives
when the policy of the act would thereby be furthered. Specifically, the dis-
sent contended that where a "solemn and costly" Board-conducted election
is lost by a union, and within a year the union demands recognition by a less
"solemn" expression of majority support, the election result should prevail
over the less formal determination of majority status.°
It is submitted that the court, in holding that Conren had violated sec-
tion 8(a) (5), recognized both the basic purpose and policy of the act and
the fact that a bargaining representative may be selected by means other than
a formal election. Further, the court recognized that the only available de-
fense to a section 8(a) (5) charge, where no union has yet been selected, is
good-faith doubt as to the union's majority status, which Conren concededly
did not have.
The fundamental purpose of the LMRA, as succinctly stated in the pre-
amble, is "to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
6 368 F.2d at 174.
7 156 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 61 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1966).
8 Conren was also directed to disestablish and withhold recognition from an
employee organization that it was found to have instigated, aided, and supported in
violation of the act. Further, Conren was required to offer reinstatement and back
pay to certain employees it was found to have discriminatorily discharged for union
activity.
9 368 F.2d at 176.
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free flow of commerce ... by encouraging . . . collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organi-
zation, and designation of representatives of their own choosing... ."'° This
basic policy must be kept in mind when a restrictive provision such as sec-
tion 9(c) (3) is analyzed, for such provisions are specific and should not be
broadly construed?' The design of the act is to foster the principle of collec-
tive bargaining with the end of insuring industrial peace, 12 and the Board
has been entrusted with the task of facilitating this goal.' 3 To implement the
basic policy of the act, certain affirmative organizational rights are given to
employees in section 7," and exclusive representatives for effectuation of
these rights are selected pursuant to section 9(a) . 15 Significantly, section 9(a)
does not provide any specific or preferable method of selecting representa-
tives. It merely establishes the requirement that a majority of the employees
in an appropriate bargaining unit make the selection. Accordingly, collective-
bargaining representatives have been selected or designated by either a formal
or an informal process.'°
The formal process, involving a Board-conducted election, is provided
for in section 9(c) (1) of the act,' 7 but its use is limited. The election is
merely a means for expressing free choice, and if such choice has been mani-
fested otherwise, there is no need for this procedure. 18 Further, an election is
not conducted merely because it was sought, but depends on the discretionary
determination by the Board that a "question of representation" exists." Be-
cause of this inherent limitation on the use of a Board-conducted election, the
procedure in section 9(c) (1) cannot be considered the exclusive method of
obtaining representation.
The informal methods of obtaining representation are not explicitly
enumerated in the act, but have been used and approved many times." A
union can obtain representational status by authorization cards, 21 by a state-
10 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 	 § 151 (1964).
II See NLRB v. Teamsters Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960); Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Local 861, IBEW, 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962).
12 International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 926 (1962).
13 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
14 "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing ...." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
15 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
14 See UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 71-72 & n.8 (1956);
NLRB v. Western Meat Packers, Inc., 350 F.2d 804, 806 (10th Cir. 1965); NLRB v.
Johnnie's Poultry Co., 344 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 1965); Shuman, Requiring a Union
to Demonstrate Its Majority Status by Means of an Election Becomes Riskier, 16 Lab.
L.J. 426 (1965); Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 Yale L.J. 805 (1966),
17 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1964).
18 NLRB v. Air Master Corp., 339 F.2d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 1964).
Ho NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74, 78 (5th Cir. 1965).
2° See authorities cited note 16 supra.
21 UMW V. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co,, supra note 16. See generally Lewis, The




conducted election, 22 or by a Board order to bargain. 23 The historic Bernet
Foam Prods. Co. decisionl, has given added importance to the use of cards
to prove majority status, particularly where an election could not be fairly
conducted. 25
 Recent cases have significantly expanded the employer's obliga-
tion to bargain on the basis of nonelective showings of majority status?'
Finally, although the informal methods may interfere with certain employer
rights which would be available if a Board-conducted election were held, 27
this does not dictate that the informal methods of determining representatives
are limited.
Although section 9(c) (3) limits the use of the formal method of select-
ing representatives, the one-year election bar should not restrict use of the
informal methods. This contention is supported by the legislative history of
section 9(c) (3). Under the Wagner Act, the Board was given authority to
certify a union upon determination by election or by "any other suitable
method" that the union commanded majority support. 28 The Board devel-
oped a "working rule" that if the certification were based on a Board-con-
ducted election, it would be honored for a reasonable time, ordinarily one
year, in the absence of unusual circumstances. This working rule, the pre-
decessor of section 9(c) (3), was expressly directed at limiting a second elec-
tion, and was not applicable to the informal methods of obtaining repre-
sentatives. The committee reports and floor statements prior to the enact-
ment of Taft-Hartley do not specifically address themselves to the scope of
section 9(c)(3) . 29 However, both the history of the section's application
prior to 1947, and the fact that it speaks explicitly of "election," indicate that
Congress was concerned only with limiting the frequency of Board-conducted
elections when it enacted this provision.
There is no doubt that section 9(c)(3) was enacted to provide for
industrial stability, but this stability is that which flows from collective bar-
22 NLRB v. Western Meat Packers, Inc., supra note 16.
23 Irving Air Chute Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 59 (1964); Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146
N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964); Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185
F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). See Note, 75 Yale L.J.
805, 807-08 (1966), for ways in which a union can obtain a compulsory bargaining
order and thus organize the plant without winning an election.
24 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964). This case held that a union need not elect between
the filing of a § 8(a) (5) charge and participation in an election.
25 See 1964-1965 Annual Survey of Labor Law, 6 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 815,
844 (1965).
26 E .g., NLRB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965); Snow
& Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962). See also
Comment, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387 (1966). Employee participation in a union-called
strike or strike vote can also be evidence of union support, resulting in an obligation
to bargain. Century Mills, Inc., 5 N.L.R.B. 807 (1938); Rabhor Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 470
(1936).
27 For example, according to § 8(c), it is not an unfair labor practice, with
certain exceptions, for an employer to publicize his views. Without a formal election
date, the employer may be unaware of organizational activity and thus might not
avail himself as fully of his rights under § 8(c) as where a Board-conducted election
will be held.
28 NLRA § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
29 See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 418, 431 (1947).
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gaining, not the stability achieved by the election itself, or the "stability"
achieved by creating a vacuum in which there issno collective labor activity
at all. One of the main purposes of section 9(c)(3) is to define clearly the
duty of the employer when a representative has been selected. 3° Similarly,
another purpose of the one-year rule is to allow a newly certified union a
reasonable time in which to fashion a labor agreements' The Board has
stated that
the fruition of collective bargaining in an agreement often requires
negotiations lasting several months. It is therefore essential to the
effectuation of the policies of the Act that the representative status,
once established, be vested with a substantial degree of stability. 32
(Emphasis added.)
Both before and after the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board and the courts did
not apply the one-year rule to a collective-bargaining relationship estab-
lished by other than a certified election 9 3 Thus, once a representative has
been designated by an election, section 9(c) (3) aids the collective-bargaining
process, at this point, by clearly initiating the obligations and rights of both
sides for one year.
That section 9(c) (3) cannot be used as a procedural obstacle to collec-
tive bargaining is manifested by the Supreme Court's approval of exceptions
to the one-year rule, emphasizing its limited applicability. 34 One such excep-
tion is illustrated by Rocky Mountain Phosphates, Inc.35 There the union
which was selected in a Board-conducted election became defunct during the
subsequent year, and a majority of the employees signed authorization cards
designating another union as their representative. The issue was whether an
employer, in firm knowledge that the elected union is defunct, can use the
one-year certification rule to deprive employees of collective bargaining for
the balance of the year simply because the new representative was barred by
section 9(c) (3) from establishing its majority status through a Board-con-
ducted election. The Board ordered the employer to bargain, holding that
section 9(c) (3) does not deprive employees of their right to select bargaining
representatives during the certification year by means other than a Board
election.
The continuing duty to bargain is manifest in other areas of the act. For
example, the existence of individual employment contracts does not delay the
obligation to bargain with a designated union,36
 nor does a contract with one
union prevent a craft severance and the obligation presently to bargain with
ao Soss Mfg. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 348, 352 (1944).
31 Rocky Mountain Phosphates, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 292 (1962).
32 Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 821, 828 (1943), enforced, 140 F.2d
217 (4th Cir. 1944).
33 See NLRB v. Mayer, 196 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1952); Squirrel Brand Co.,
104 N.L.R.B. 289, 290 (1953); Joe Hearin, Lumber, 66 N.L.R.B. 1276, 1283 (1946).
34 See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
85 138 N.L.R.B. 292 (1962),
33 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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the new group." Disagreement with the Board's determination of the appro-
priate unit will not relieve an employer from the obligation to bargain. 38
Union picketing in violation of section 8(b) (7) (C) will not be a defense to a
section 8(a) (5) charge of refusal to bargain. 3° The employer cannot insist on
an election" or certification" as a condition precedent to bargaining, nor can
he insist on a "clear-cut" request for recognition as exclusive bargaining
representative when he has no good-faith doubt of union majority status.42
Filing a representation petition does not suspend the employer's duty to
bargain." Furthermore, when a union seeks recognition by authorization
cards, there is no requirement that they be delivered or exhibited to the
employer as a prerequisite to a demand for bargaining or to a finding of a
section 8(a) (5) violation." The act is thus permeated with the philosophy
that procedural obstacles cannot be placed in the path of establishing a col-
lective-bargaining relationship. Clearly there is no employer right not to
bargain. The present state of the law is that once an employer is informed in
any manner45 that a majority of his employees desire representation, and
there has been no deceit or coercion by the union, he is required to recognize
and bargain in good faith."
Conren had no doubts about the majority status of the union, and
was using section 9(c) (3) to shield it from an obligation imposed by both
an explicit legislative policy and a clear history of case law. The only defense
to a section 8(a) (5 ) charge which Conren could have invoked is genuine
good-faith doubt as to the majority status of the union:" But Conren was
clearly acting in bad faith, since it had no doubt about the majority status
of the union at the time of the request." The dissent, which contended that
37 American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1421 (1954); American
Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 255 (1953).
38 See May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945).
39 Greenfield Printing & Publishing Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 363 (1962).
40 NLRB v. Johnnie's Poultry Co., supra note 16; NLRB v. Decker, 296 F.2d 338
(8th Cir. 1961); Snow & Sons, supra note 26.
41 Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc., Ill N.L.R.B. 244 (1955), enforced, 229 F.2d 391 (8th
Cir. 1956).
42 Joy Silk Mills, Inc., supra note 23; Differential Steel Car Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 714
(1948).
43 Master Transmission Rebuilding Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 60 L.R.R.M. 1317
(1965); Irving Air Chute Co., supra note 23; Permacold Indus., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 885
(1964). The only time that the filing of a representation petition suspends the duty to
bargain is when two or more unions file petitions, thus creating "a question of representa-
tion affecting commerce," and a Board-conducted election must be held under the Mid-
west Piping doctrine. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
44 Retail Clerks Union, 153 N.L.R.B. 204 (1965).
45 See Shuman, supra note 16, at 426, 427.
48 Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 161 (1964), enforced, 354 F.2d 432 (8th
Cir. 1965); Irving Air Chute Co., supra note 23; Elliott-Williams Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 811
(1963), enforced, 345 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1965); Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 11
N.L.R.B. 408 (1939), enforced, 112 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1940).
47 Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 128, 135 (8th Cir. 1965); Larry Faul Olds-
mobile Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 697 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1963); Rocky
Mountain Phosphates, Inc., supra note 35; Trimfit, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 706 (1952),
enforced, 211 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1954); Joy Silk Mills, Inc., supra note 23.
48 Cf. Snow & Sons, supra note 26.
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Conren owed no duty to bargain with a union that had lost an election
within a year, relied heavily on two particular cases. Upon examination,
however, these cases can be reconciled with the majority opinion.
In Brooks v. NLRB, 49 the union won a Board-conducted election and
was duly certified. Shortly thereafter, however, the union concededly lost
its majority status without fault of the employer. The Supreme Court held
that the employer was under a statutory duty to bargain in spite of the
union's manifest support by a minority only. The dissent in Conren argued
that the converse of Brooks should apply, so that the union's defeat in the
election would mean there was no statutory duty to bargain for one year.
The Brooks case, however, supports the basic policy of the act by requiring
collective bargaining between the employer and the union which won the
election. Though a majority no longer supported the union, the frustration
of employee desires was justified because the result furthered collective
bargaining. The case is thereby distinguishable from Conren, in which the
employer attempted to use section 9(c)(3) to avoid recognition and to
frustrate employee desires at the expense of collective bargaining. Finally, in
both Brooks and Conren, the Board decisions were affirmed and enforced,
giving deference to the Board's administrative authority to apply section
9(c) (3) in a manner conducive to furthering collective bargaining.
In NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 5° the union lost a Board-conducted
election. The union then filed objections, whereupon the Board, after a
hearing, set the election aside on the basis of antiunion coercive statements
made by the employer during the preelection period. When a second
election was won by the union, the company refused to bargain. In the
unfair labor practice hearing which followed, the Board concluded that the
first election was in fact valid, and therefore, because of section 9(c) (3),
the second election was invalid and imposed no duty on the employer to
bargain. 51 Blades, however, in no way indicated that the union would be
prohibited from seeking representation by informal methods within the
twelve months following the valid election.
In conclusion, although section 9(c) (3) does prohibit the holding of
a second election within a year, it does not preclude determination of
representative status by other means. The purpose of the election procedure
is to ascertain majority status when doubt exists, not to supply the employer
with a procedural device to obstruct collective bargaining. By submitting
to the election, employees do not waive other rights under the act. 52 Although
it might be easier to administer section 9(c) (3) so as to prohibit collective
bargaining for one year after the union loses an election, an abridgement of
rights under the act should not be sanctioned where the purposes of the
40 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
50 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965), denying enforcement to 144 N.L.R.B. 561 (1963).
51 It is suggested that there was no reason for the Board to order a second election
at all in Blades, since the Board, had it found coercive activity, could have set aside the
election which the union lost, and ordered the employer to bargain. Bannon Mills, Inc.,
146 N.L.R.B. 611, 613 (1964); Western Aluminum, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1191, 1192
(1963); Joy Silk Mills, Inc., supra note 23.
62 Bernd Foam Prods. Co., supra note 23.
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act are defeated. As the Board has noted in a comparable context, "What-
ever may be lost in maximum industrial efficiency . . . is more than compen-
sated for by the gain in industrial democracy .. .." 53 If section 9(c) (3)
is to be construed as prohibiting collective bargaining for one year after
an election lost by the union, this mandate should issue from Congress and
not through judicial legislation."
RUTH R. BUDD
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Unfair Labor Practices
—Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation.—Local 12, United Rubber
Workers v. NLRB. 1—Petitioner, Local 12, was the exclusive bargaining
representative of all the employees at an Alabama Goodyear plant. Although
the bargaining contract negotiated and administered by Local 12 appeared
to provide otherwise, separate seniority rolls were maintained for White
and Negro employees, and, as a result, Negro employees had no greater
rights than White employees with less seniority. In addition, although not
prescribed by the contract, racially separate plant facilities were maintained.
In the Fall of 1961, a Negro employee was laid off even though a White
employee with less seniority was being retained. As a result of this action,
he and seven other Negroes, who were also in layoff status, appeared before
the union grievance committee and demanded reinstatement with back pay,
transfer privileges as provided in the contract, and desegregation of plant
facilities. The committee rejected their claims, and the complainants appealed
to the International President of the union, who reversed the local's refusal
to process the grievances. Local 12 then obtained an agreement from
the company dissolving the separate seniority rolls, but it continued in its
refusal to process the grievances concerning back pay and segregated plant
facilities. Consequently, the complainants filed unfair-labor-practice charges
against Local 12.
Reversing the trial examiner, the National Labor Relations Board rule&
that, by refusing to process these grievances, Local 12 had not only violated
Sections 8(b) (2) and (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act,3 but had also violated
section 8(b) (1) (A) by restraining or coercing complainants in their section
7 right to be represented "without invidious discrimination."' Local 12
53 American Potash & Chem. Corp., supra note 37, at 1423.
54 Certiori has recently been denied in the principal case. 35 U.S.L. Week 3330 (U.S.
March 21, 1967).
1 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
2 Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964).
3 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(2), (3) (1964). The violations of
these sections are not discussed by the court, and thus are not subjects of this note.
4 150 N.L.R.B. at 315. LMRA § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964)
provides that
employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities . . . .
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